This paper considers the optimal taxation of savings intermediation and payment services in a dynamic general equilibrium setting, when the government can also use consumption and income taxes. When payment services are used in strict proportion to …nal consumption, and the cost of intermediation services is …xed and the same across …rms, the optimal taxes are generally indeterminate. But, when …rms di¤er exogenously in the cost of intermediation services, the tax on savings intermediation should be zero. Also, when household time and payment services are substitutes in transactions, the optimal tax rate on payment services is determined by the returns to scale in the conditional demand for payment services, and is generally di¤erent to the optimal rate on consumption goods. The extension to the case of  commodities is studied, and conditions su¢cient for uniform taxation of goods and payment services within a period are obtained, generalizing the analysis of Auerbach and Gordon(2002).
Introduction
Financial intermediation services include such important services as intermediation between borrowers and lenders, insurance, and payment services (e.g. credit and debit card services). These services comprise a signi…cant and growing part of the national economy; for example, …nancial intermediation services, measured using the OECD methodology 1 , were 3.9% of GDP in the UK in 1970, and increased to 7.9% by 2005. The …gures for the Eurozone countries as a whole are 2.7% to 5.5%. In the US, the …nance and insurance sector, excluding real estate, which includes …nancial intermediation, accounted for 7.3% of US value-added in 1999, rising to 8.4% in 2009 2 .
The question of whether, and how, …nancial intermediation services should be taxed is a contentious one. In the tax policy literature, it is largely assumed that within a consumption tax system, such as a VAT, it is desirable to tax …nancial services. For example, the European Commission has recently proposed changes to the VAT treatment of …nancial services within the European Union, so as bring these more within the scope of VAT (de la Feria and Lockwood (2010) ). Also, the recent IMF proposals for a "bank tax" to cover the cost of government interventions in the banking system include a Financial Activities Tax levied on bank pro…ts and remuneration, which would work very much like a VAT, levied using the addition method (IMF(2010) ).
But, it is also recognized that there are technical di¢culties in taxing …nancial intermediation when those services are not explicitly priced (so-called margin-based services), such as the intermediation between borrowers and lenders. This raises a problem for the use of a VAT via the usual invoice-credit method, for example (Ebril, Keen, Bodin and Summers(2001) ). As a result of this, the status quo in most countries is that a wide range of …nancial intermediation services are not taxed 3 . However, conceptually, the problems can be solved, for example, by use of a cash- ‡ow VAT (Ho¤man et. al.(1987) , Poddar and English(1997) , Huizinga(2002) , Zee(2005) ), and the increasing sophistication of banks' IT systems means that these solutions are also becoming practical. So, it is increasingly relevant to ask, setting aside the technical problems, should …nancial intermediation services supplied to households be taxed at all? And if so, at what rates? Given the overall importance of …nancial services to modern economies, there is surprisingly little written on this more fundamental question (Section 2 has a discussion of the literature). Moreover, we would argue that the existing literature does not really clarify which of the fundamental principles of tax design apply. For example, is it the case that …nancial intermediation services are intermediate goods in the production of …nal consumption for households, and thus should not be taxed? Or, should they be taxed at the same rate as other goods purchased on the market, at least under conditions when a uniform consumption tax is optimal?
The objective of this paper is to address these fundamental questions 4 . We set up and solve the tax design problem in a dynamic general equilibrium model of the Chamley(1986) type, where the government chooses taxes on payment services and savings intermediation, as well as the usual taxes on consumption (or equivalently, wage income) and income from capital, and where …nancial intermediaries, in the form of banks, are explicitly modelled. On the payment services side, we assume, following the literature on the transactions cost approach to the demand for money, that payment services are not necessarily proportional to consumption, but can be used to economize on the household time input to trading. This is realistic: for example, making use of a basic bank account requires a time input, e.g. trips to the bank, but use of an additional payment service e.g. a credit card, substitutes for trips to the bank. We assume that the cost of savings intermediation per unit of capital is …xed, but can vary across borrowers (…rms). Again, this is realistic; savings intermediation is a complex process involving initial assessment of the borrower via e.g. credit scoring, structuring and pricing the loan, and monitoring compliance with loan covenants (Gup and Kolari(2005, chapter 9 ). The extension to variable costs of savings intermediation is addressed in Lockwood(2010) .
We then solve the tax design problem, where the government has access to a full set of taxes, i.e. the usual wage and capital income taxes, plus a tax on the consumption good and on payment services, and a tax paid by the bank on the spread between borrowing and lending rates. We set the wage tax equal to zero to eliminate the usual tax indeterminacy via the household budget constraint, and focus on the four remaining taxes.
The tax on savings intermediation is determined as follows. In the tax design problem, the tax on capital income is used as the instrument to pin down the rate of substitution 4 It should be noted that this paper does not deal with corrective taxes on bank lending designed to internalize the social costs of bank failure or the costs of bailout; on this, see e.g. Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz(2000) , Keen(2010) or Bianchi and Mendoza(2010) . between present and future consumption for the household. So, this means that the tax on savings intermediation is a "free instrument" that can be used to ensure that capital is allocated e¢ciently across …rms. In turn, the cost of capital to a particular …rm will be the cost of capital to the bank i.e. the return paid to depositors, plus the cost of intermediation, where the latter includes any tax. A non-zero tax on savings intermediation will distort the relative cost of capital across …rms, and so this tax is optimally set to zero. This is a version of the Diamond-Mirrlees production e¢ciency result.
Turning to the tax on the payment service, our …rst result is that the total tax "wedge" between consumption and leisure is a weighted average of the tax on consumption and on the payment service, and is determined by a standard optimal tax formula, involving the general equilibrium expenditure elasticity of consumption (Atkeson, Chari, and Kehoe(1999) ). However, the sign of the tax on the payment service itself is determined 5 not by the structure of preferences, but by the properties of the conditional demand for payment services as a function of the household consumption level and time input to transactions, or "shopping time". In particular, when this conditional demand has constant returns with respect to these variables, payment services should be untaxed; this can be understood as an instance of the Diamond-Mirrlees production e¢ciency result. The general conclusion is that the tax on payment services is determined in a completely di¤erent way to the tax on consumption, and thus will in general be at a di¤erent rate.
We then extend the analysis to many consumption goods in each period. We make the plausible assumption that there is only one kind of payment service that must be taxed at the same rate, whichever good it is used to purchase. We show that the presence of payment services generally makes it less likely that commodity taxation will be uniform within the period. Moreover, even if conditions hold for commodity taxation to be uniform, this does not imply that payment services need to be taxed at the same uniform rate as commodities. Generally, what is required for the same uniform tax on both goods and payment services are: (i) standard conditions for uniformity i.e. separability in goods and leisure, plus a homothetic goods sub-utility function, plus either (ii) no time input to transactions, or (iii) that time and payment services are not substitutable in the production of tranactions services i.e. Leontief technology, and the ratio of payment services to time required is uniform across goods. These results generalize, and demonstrate the limitations of, the Auerbach-Gordon(2002) result that if goods are subject to a uniform tax, payment services should be subject to the same tax.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature. Section 3 outlines the model, and explains how existing contributions can be viewed as special cases. Section 4 presents the main results. Section 5 studies the case of  commodities, Section 6 considers other extensions, and Section 7 concludes.
Related Literature
There is a small literature directly addressing the optimal taxation of borrower-lender intermediation and payment services, Grubert and Mackie(1999) , Jack(1999) , Auerbach and Gordon (2002) , and Boadway and Keen(2003) . Using for the most part a simple twoperiod consumption-savings model, these papers broadly agree on a policy prescription 6 .
Given a consumption tax that is uniform across goods (at a point in time), payment services should be taxed at this uniform rate, but savings intermediation should be left untaxed. The argument used to establish this is simple; in a two-period consumptionsavings model with the same, exogenously …xed, tax on consumption in both periods, this arrangement leaves the marginal rate of substitution between current and future consumption undistorted i.e. equal to the marginal rate of transformation 7 .
However, one can make three criticisms of the current literature. First, even taking their set-up as given, their optimal taxes are indeterminate. Purely mathematically, two taxes cannot be uniquely determined from a single e¢ciency condition. Second, in their analysis, consumption (wage) and capital income taxes are taken as given, and not optimized by the government. Third, relative to the model of this paper, the models analyzed in the current literature are very special in a number of respects. For example, implicitly, these papers are assuming 8 a …xed labour supply, so that a uniform tax on consumption over the life-cycle is …rst-best e¢cient, as it does not distort the intertemporal allocation of consumption, and thus …nancial intermediation should not do so 6 Chia and Whalley(1999) , using a computational approach, reach the rather di¤erent conclusion that no intermediation services should be taxed, but but their model is not directly comparable to these others, as the intermediation costs are assemed to be proportional to the price of the goods being transacted. 7 Auerbach and Gordon(2002) have a model that is in some respects more general, and they also take a di¤erent analytical approach. Speci…cally, their model allows for  periods, multiple consumption goods, and variable labour supply. In this setting, they show that a uniform tax on all commodities and payment services is equivalent to a wage tax. Thus, they show that if a uniform commodity tax is optimal, payment services should be taxed at the same rate, consistently with the other literature cited. 8 The exception here is Auerbach and Gordon(2002) , where labour supply is variable. However, in their model, the consumption tax is just assumed to be uniform, not optimised.
either. Again, special assumptions are made about the demand for payment services, and intermediation activities of banks. Speci…cally, they assume (i) that payment services are consumed in proportion to consumption; (ii) that the costs of savings intermediation are in proportion to capital invested. We are able to show that the basic result of this literature -i.e. that intermediation taxes are indeterminate, but that an optimal tax structure is to tax payment services at the same rate as consumption, but exempt savings intermediation -also emerges in our model when all of these special assumptions are made (Proposition 1 below). A less closely related literature is that on the optimal in ‡ation tax which takes a transaction costs approach to the demand for money (Kimbrough(1986) , , Teles(1996, 1999) ). In this literature, money formally plays a role similar to payment services in our model; the main di¤erences are (i) that it is assumed a free good i.e. it has a zero production cost, and (ii) it is subject to an in ‡ation tax, rather than a …scal tax. While (ii) makes no di¤erence from an analytical point of view, (i) does; it turns out that when money is free, the optimal in ‡ation tax is zero, as long as the transactions demand for household time is a homogenous function of money and consumption. A much more closely related …nding is in Correia and Teles (1996) , where, in Section 3 of their paper, money is allowed to have a positive production cost. Proposition 3 below can be regarded as an extension of Proposition 2 in their paper.
Finally, one can interpret the use of payment services and time as inputs to household production of …nal consumption goods, so our analysis is linked to the small literature on optimal taxation with household production, particularly Kleven(2004) . These links are explored further in Section 6.1 below.
The Model

Households
The model is a version of Atkeson, Chari and Kehoe(1999) with payment services and savings intermediation. There is a single in…nitely lived household with preferences over levels of a single consumption good, leisure, and a public good in each period  = 0 1 of the form
where   is the level of …nal consumption in period    is the consumption of leisure, and   is public good provision. Utilities ( ) () are strictly increasing and strictly concave in their arguments. We take a transactions cost approach to the demand for payment services 9 , and suppose that consumption   incurs a transaction cost in terms of household time, and this cost is reduced by the use of payment services    For example, making use of a bank account requires a time input, e.g. trips to the bank, but use of an additional payment service e.g. a credit card substitutes for trips to the bank. Then we have
where  is increasing in    and decreasing in    To help intuition, consider a special case where consumption level   requires   separate transactions, and where a fraction  of these transactions are undertaken from a transactional account with a credit card, and the remainder,1 ¡  from a transactional account without a credit card, where visits to the bank to withdraw cash are required. Also assume for simplicity that there is no interest penalty with a transactional account i.e. it pays the same as a savings account 10 . Then, the amount of payment services required is   =  +     where  is the …xed cost of maintaining a credit card account, and  is the amount of payment services needed per transaction. Also, the household time needed is
 where  is the number of transactions …nanced by a single trip to the bank, assumed …xed. Eliminating  from between these two equations gives a linear time demand function
It turns out that for our purposes, it is convenient to describe the implicit relationship
In the case of the linear time demand function, (3.2),  takes the form
Speci…cation (3.4) is interesting not only because it has plausible microfoundations, but also because it nests the existing literature as a special case: this literature e¤ectively assumes  independent of   and linear homogenous in    i.e.   =    This is of course 9 This is of course, analagous to the transactions cost theory of the demand for money. 10 This is, to a …rst approximation, a reasonable assumption; transactions accounts do pay similar rates of interest to instant access savings accounts. It is also analytically very convenient: without it, a version of the Baumol-Tobin inventory demand theory would come into play, implying that    conditional on    would also depend on       which are determined in general equilibrium, and this would greatly complicate the analysis. a special case of (3.4) where there are no …xed costs ( = 0)  =  and no account without a credit card. In the general case, following , we will assume that  is convex in its arguments; this ensures that the household problem is concave.
The household thus supplies labour to the market of amount
where the total endowment of time per period is set at unity. In each period  the household also saves  +1 in units of the consumption good, and deposits it with a bank, who can then lend it on to …rms who can use it as an input to production in the next period, after which they must repay the loan to the bank, who then in turn repays the household. So, in this model, capital only lasts one period. Finally, the household has no pro…t income in any period: …rms may generate pure pro…ts (see Section 3.2 below), but these are taxed at 100%. In any period  household is assumed to pay ad valorem taxes 
and also pays proportional taxes on labour and capital income. Using the well-known fact that an uniform consumption tax (i.e.    =    ) is equivalent to a wage tax, we assume w.l.o.g. that the wage tax is zero We also assume for convenience that one unit of the consumption good can be transformed into one unit of payment services or one unit of the public good. Moreover, in equilibrium, payment services are priced at marginal cost (see Section 3.3 below). This …xes the relative pre-tax price of      and   at unity.
So, the present value budget constraint of the household is
where   is the price of output in period    is the after-tax return on capital to the household, and   is the wage. We normalize by setting  0 = 1 and assume for convenience
where   is the pre-tax return on capital, determined below, and    is the capital income tax. Substituting (3.3),(3.5) in (3.6) gives:
The …rst-order conditions for a maximum of (3.1) subject to (3.7) with respect to           +1 respectively are:
where  is the multiplier on (3.7), and we use (here and below) the notation that for any any function  and variables      , the partial derivative of  with respect to   is    the cross-derivative is   etc. Note that using this notation, the consumer price of …nal consumption is
)  a weighted sum of the prices facing the household of    and   
Firms
There are …rms,  = 1  with produce the homogenous good in each period Firm  produces output from labour and capital via the strictly concave, decreasing returns, production function
 are capital and labour inputs. We assume that …rms face decreasing returns, because for …xed policy, they will generally face di¤erent costs of capital, but the same wage, and so in this environment, with constant returns, only the one …rm with the lowest unit cost would operate. This case is of limited interest because then, a spread tax cannot a¤ect the relative cost of capital of di¤erent …rms, which means in turn that there is no e¢ciency argument for setting the spread tax to zero.
These …rms are assumed to be perfectly competitive. But, they cannot purchase capital directly from households, but must borrow from banks. Moreover, we suppose that …rms may di¤er in intermediation costs, as described in more detail in Section 3.3 below. So, …rms face di¤erences in the cost of capital i.e. …rm  must repay 1 +    per unit of capital borrowed from the bank. Thus, pro…t-maximization implies:
And, in addition, the capital and labour market clearing conditions are:
These conditions (3.12),(3.13) jointly determine   and   , given household savings and labour supply decisions.
Banks
Banks in this economy provide two possible services. First, they can provide payment services to the households i.e. supply    Second, they can provide intermediation between households and …rms. Banks can compete on price for both these activities (i.e. households see the banks as perfect substitutes, both with respect to payment and intermediation services). We also assume no economies of scope, and constant returns in the provision of both services, so that banks must break even on both services. Assuming w.l.o.g. that the marginal and average cost of payment services is 1 in units of the consumption good, the price of payment services will also be 1 in equilibrium. The cost of intermediating one unit of savings between the household and …rm  is   .
Note that we take   as …xed, but possibly varying between …rms, for reasons discussed in the introduction. We also suppose that "spread" i.e. the value of intermediation services provided by the bank, can be taxed at some rate    In turn, the value of intermediation services is measured by    ¡    where    is the lending rate to …rm  and   is the rate paid to depositors. So,   is a tax on both intermediation services provided to households, and to …rms 12 . Then, as banks make zero pro…t on this activity, we must have
Then, from (3.14):
We refer to    as the spread tax from now on.
Discussion
The above model provides a general framework which encompasses the speci…c models of taxation of …nancial services (Auerbach and Gordon (2002), Boadway and Keen(2003) ), Jack(1999) , Grubert and Mackie(1999) ) that have been developed so far. For example, Boadway and Keen (2003)), Jack(1999) , Grubert and Mackie(1999) are two-period versions of the above model 13 , with (implicitly) …xed labour supply. Auerbach and Gordon (2002) 12 In principle, one could allow for the intermediation services received by these two parties to be taxed at di¤erent rates, but in practice, this is very di¢cult to implement (Poddar and English(1997) ). Moreover, in our framework, the addition of this feature in our model would lead to tax indeterminacy. 13 A minor quali…cation here is that Boadway and Keen allow for a …xed cost of savings intermediation e.g. …xed costs of opening a savings account. These introduce a non-convexity into household decisionmaking, which greatly complicates the optimal tax problem, and so we abstract from these in this paper.
is a …nite-horizon version of the model, with the additional feature 14 that there are  consumption goods in each period. This raises some new issues, and the case of  goods is covered in Section 5 below. As already noted in Section 2, the feature of all these contributions, however, is the special assumptions they implicitly make about demand for payment services and bank intermediation. On the household side, they all assume, …rst, that payment services are needed in …xed proportion to consumption and that (implicitly) that a time input   is not required from the household. In our model, this amounts to the assumptions that (     ) =   in (3.3), in which case, choosing the constant to be unity,   =    On banking activity, the existing literature assumes that the cost of intermediation in …xed proportion to household savings. In the context of our model, this requires
…rms are all the same with respect to intermediation costs, or -equivalently -there is only one …rm. Finally, the relation of our model to the optimal in ‡ation tax literature is as follows. Our modelling of household demand for intermediation services is closely related to the "transactions cost" view of the demand for money in that literature (Corriea and Teles(1996) , (1999)). In particular, if we de…ne   as real money balances, their transactions cost function is an inversion of (3.3) to obtain   as a function of      ; then, increased real money balances reduce the labour transactions costs of consumption. The models in this literature do not allow for physical capital or taxation of capital income, or costly money, and so in this sense are more special. Nevertheless, one of our results, Proposition 3 below, is related to that literature, especially Proposition 2 of Correia and Teles(1996) .
A Benchmark Indeterminacy Result
Here, we make the assumptions of the existing literature (Auerbach and Gordon (2002), Boadway and Keen(2003) ), Jack(1999) , Grubert and Mackie(1999) ), namely: (i) that conditional demand for   is independent of   and linear in   i.e.   =   ; (ii) only one type of …rm; and (iii) a …xed consumption tax    and a zero capital income tax    = 0. Under these assumptions, we show that optimal taxes on …nancial intermediation are generally indeterminate. Note from (3.8)-(3.11) that given (i) i.e.   = 1 and    = 0 we have: (3.16) 14 It also has labour supply in only one period.
Moreover, from (3.12), (3.15), given only one …rm:
where
Now say that the sequence f
=0 is a restricted optimal tax structure on …nancial services if the inter-temporal allocation of consumption is left undistorted by taxes. From (3.18), this requires:
Then two conclusions that can easily be drawn from (3.19). First, f
is not uniquely determined from (3.19) i.e. there is indeterminacy in the restricted optimal tax structure. The second is that of the many optimal tax combinations,
has the advantage that it is optimal, independently of knowledge of     and is thus administratively convenient. We can thus summarize: Proposition 1. In the benchmark case, with (i) conditional demand for   independent of   and linear in   ; (ii) only one type of …rm; and (iii) a …xed consumption tax  This result summarizes the …ndings of the existing literature, in the context of our model. It is important to emphasize that under the assumptions made by the existing literature, optimal taxes on …nancial intermediation are in fact indeterminate. This main purpose of this paper is to relax these assumptions in an empirically plausible way, and at the same time generate determinacy in the tax structure.
Tax Design
We take a primal approach to the tax design problem. In this approach, an optimal policy for the government is a choice of all the primal variables in the model, in this case
to maximize utility (3.1) subject to the capital and labour market clearing conditions (3.13), aggregate resource, and implementability constraints. We are thus assuming, following Chamley(1986) , that the government can pre-commit to policy at  = 0 The aggregate resource constraint says that total production must equal to the sum of the uses to which that production is put:
The implementability constraint ensures that the government's choices also solve the household optimization problem. First, by de…nition,
where   is the overhead cost of payment services. The most plausible case is where there is a …xed cost to payment services i.e.    0 Substituting (4.2) back into (3.7), we obtain:
Then, using the household's …rst-order conditions (3.8)-(3.11) in (4.3), we …nally arrive at the government's implementability constraint:
where in (4.4), the expression:
is the overhead cost of payment services, normalized by    0 and can thus be interpreted as the virtual pro…t of the household from transacting on the market. In the most plausible case where there is a …xed cost to payment services i.e.    0, virtual pro…t is negative. So, as is standard in the primal approach to tax design, we can incorporate the implementability constraint (4.4) into the government's maximand by writing
where  is the Lagrange multiplier on (4.4). If   · 0 it is possible to show that ¸0 at the optimum (see Appendix). If  = 0 the revenue from pro…t taxation is su¢cient to fund the public good,  We will rule out this uninteresting case, and so will assume that   0 at the optimum in what follows The government's choice of primal variables must maximize P 1 =0     subject to (4.1) and (4.4). The …rst-order conditions with respect to
 are the multipliers on the resource, capital market, and labour market conditions at time  respectively. Moreover, from (4.6), Atkeson, Chari and Kehoe(1999) call the general equilibrium expenditure elasticity. Note that if there are constant returns to scale, virtual pro…t  ´0  and so      are reduce to standard formulae found, for example, in the primal approach to the static tax design problem (Atkinson and Stiglitz(1980) ). We begin by characterizing the tax on capital income and the spread tax, where we have a sharp result with strong intuition. It is possible to manipulate the …rst-order conditions to the household and government optimization problems to get (all proofs in Appendix):
where at any date should be zero. The intuition for this result is clear. From (4.12), (4.10), we see that at any date 
That is, the marginal product of capital net of true intermediation costs should be equal across …rms, which of course is just the condition for capital to be allocated e¢ciently across …rms. But, condition (4.17) is generally not consistent with a non-zero spread tax when …rms are heterogenous, as then from (3.12), (3.15),
This is just an instance of the Diamond-Mirrlees production e¢ciency theorem. A tax on the spread is an intermediate tax on the allocation of capital, and given our assumptions (a full set of tax instruments, and no pure pro…ts), this tax should be set to zero. Note also that when there is only one …rm, this argument has no bite, and thus   is left indeterminate, as in Proposition 1.
Finally, we see that in the steady state,    = 0 So, the celebrated result of Chamley(1986) that in the steady state, the tax on capital income is zero continues to hold in our setting. In this sense, the optimal structure of wage and capital income taxes is separable from the optimal tax on borrower-lender intermediation.
Next, we turn to characterize the tax on payment services. The …rst step is to characterize the total tax on …nal consumption, which from (3.8) is the weighted sum of  
Note that (4.18) is a formula for an optimal consumption tax that also occurs in the static optimal tax problem, when the primal approach is used (Atkinson and Stiglitz(1980, p377) . In particular,   is the marginal bene…t of $1 to the government, and   is a measure of the marginal utility of $1 to the household, so ¡  is a measure of the social gain from additional taxation at the margin. But, inspection of (4.14) and (4.15) reveals that in our analysis, the      are generally di¤erent to the static case, unless   = 0 which occurs when there are constant returns in the conditional demand for payment services,  = 1 Note also that the optimal tax    +      on …nal consumption is a weighted average of two taxes on marketed goods,   and    and thus these two separate taxes are not yet determinate.
The next result characterizes     and can be stated as follows 15 :
Proposition 4. If household demand for payment services depends on the time input (   0) any date  the optimal ad valorem tax on payment services is
where   is the marginal e¤ect of   on virtual pro…t (4.5). But, if conditional demand for payment services is independent of the time input (  = 0) then the optimal tax on payment services is indeterminate.
That is, generally,    is determinate, but under the special conditions of the existing literature, when   = 0 it is not. In the main case of interest, when    is determinate, we see that it is not general equal to the right-hand side of (4.18) but is instead determined by the e¤ect of   on the the virtual pro…t of the household,    This of course, implies that in general, …nancial services should not be taxed at the same rate as the consumption good i.e.    6 =     contrary to the claims of the existing literature. So, how is    determined? First, the sign of    is the sign of ¡   One intuition for this is as follows. If the government imposes a positive tax on    this will cause a reduction in    and at a …xed level of consumption,    a compensating increase in    If this decreases virtual pro…t for the household, which is not directly taxable, this is desirable. But this last e¤ect is measured just by ¡   Note that in the special case of constant returns of , then  ´0     = 0 This can be understood as an instance of the 15 As noted in Section 2, Proposition 3 is related to Proposition 2 of Corriea and Teles(1996) . They consider what is formally a very similar tax design problem. The main di¤erences are; (i) Proposition 3 extends their analysis by providing an explicit formula for the optimal tax rate; (ii) they work with a di¤erent speci…cation of (3.3), namely where   is the dependent variable.
Diamond-Mirrlees Theorem; if household "pro…t" is zero, the intermediate good, payment services, should not be taxed.
More generally, there is an analogy here with the Corlett-Hague rule, which says that goods complementary with non-taxable leisure should be taxed more heavily. An analogy can also be drawn with tax design when there are non-constant returns to scale in the production of marketed goods. In that case, it has long been known that in this situation, a deviation from aggregate production e¢ciency (non-taxation of intermediate goods) is optimal. For example, Stiglitz and Dasgupta(1971) show that factors of production should be taxed more heavily when used in industries where pure rent is positive and cannot be taxed at 100%. Here, the principle is similar: the factor of production,    should be taxed (subsidized), if it causes -indirectly, via   -pro…t to rise (fall).
We can now focus on the determinants of the sign of    We start with the speci…ca-tion (3.4), a¢ne conditional demand. In this case, it is clear that   =   and thus   = 0 implying a zero tax on payment services
16 . An alternative form for  can be derived from the literature on optimal in ‡ation tax, where it is often assumed that (     ) is a homogenous function (Kimbrough(1986), , Teles(1996, 1999) ). In this case, without loss of generality 17 , we can write
This is homogeneous of degree  and is convex i¤  00  0 so we assume these properties. It is then possible to show:
¢  is constant elasticity, then at any date  the optimal ad valorem tax on payment services is 
So, if    2 +    and if there are decreasing (increasing) returns to scale, then    is positive (negative). So, in a wide variety of cases,     0 if there are decreasing returns to scale. This is the plausible case, as it corresponds to some …xed-cost element of payment services. 16 Note that this not a special case of constant returns, as (3.4) is not constant returns in       17 This is true because (
But, we cannot rule out a negative tax on payment services. So, overall, the conclusion is that while the optimal tax on payment services is likely to be positive or zero, a subsidy cannot be ruled out.
Many Consumption Goods
So far, we have assumed only one …nal consumption good for the household. With many consumption goods, the new issue is when it is optimal to have uniform commodity taxation within the period and what this implies for taxation of payment services. We now extend the baseline model to accommodate many consumption goods. To focus on payment services, we assume that there is only one …rm, for whom the cost of savings intermediation,  is zero. In each period, the consumer has preferences over  goods,
To keep things reasonably simple, we suppose that demand for payment services   used for purchase of good  takes the Cobb-Douglas form
where   is the amount of time services that are used, and   is the returns to scale in the conditional demand for   . This encompasses the case studied by Auerbach and Gordon(2002) , who (implicitly) assume that   = 0 and   = 1 18  If every consumption good has its own dedicated payment service, then Propositions 3 and 4 carry over basically unchanged. However, this is very unrealistic; in practice, households use just a small number of checking accounts, credit cards, etc. So, we focus on more realistic scenario where there is just type of one payment service, which must be taxed at the same rate in all its uses i.e. every   must be taxed at the rate     As we will see, this imposes additional constraints on the tax design problem. The time and present-value budget constraints are modi…ed in the obvious way to
18 See page 412 of their paper, where it is stated that "time costs..do not enter into the budget constraint as written here..", implying   = 0 and where there is a …xed transaction cost per unit of the good consumed, requiring that transactions cost are linear in    respectively. In (5.3), the government now has separate commodity taxes    for each of the  goods.
Then, the household chooses
subject to (5.1), (5.2), (5.3). It is then straightforward to set up the government's tax design problem, in particular the implementability constraint, much as in the previous Section. The main di¤erence is that because all the   must be taxed at the same rate, from (A.16), the household's …rst-order condition for the choice of    the derivatives of   (     ) with respect to    denoted     must all be the same across goods, so we need to impose the additional constraints on the government that
The government can, however, choose   because this is the equivalent, in the primal problem, of choosing the tax     This problem can again be solved using the primal approach (see Appendix B). Note that the overall e¤ective commodity tax on good  in period  is  Proposition 6. (i) At any date  the optimal total ad valorem tax on …nal consumption good  is
where      are de…ned in (29) (30) in Appendix B, and   are the multipliers on (5.4), and
At any date  the optimal ad valorem tax on payment services is
In the special case where
So, comparing Proposition 6 with Propositions 3 and 4, we see several qualitative di¤erences, due to the constraints (5.4). First, the formula for the overall tax on good     +       does not precisely follow an Atkinson-Stiglitz type formula, due to the additional e¤ect ¡(  ¡   )     which may be positive or negative, depending on whether the constraint    =  binds more or less tightly than the average across commodities. Second, the formula for    now depends on the weighted average of economies of scale in the conditional demand functions, i.e.
 there is an adjustment given by the last term in (5.6), re ‡ecting the additional constraints (5.4).
We can now address the question of when taxation on …nal consumption goods is uniform, and what implications this has for the taxation of payment services. There are two straightforward special cases here. The …rst is where conditional demand (5.1) is constant returns i.e.   = 1  = 1  Then,
Under certain well-known conditions, this   is independent of  for example, if
It then follows from (5.5) that the tax on the consumption good, and on …nal consumption overall, is uniform i.e.    =    at a rate given by the right-hand side of (5.5)
The second special case is where
case, as in Proposition 2, only the weighted average of    and    is well-de…ned via (5.5). In this case,   is again de…ned in (5.8), so in this case, the left-hand side of (5.5) is constant across  if (c     ) = ((c  )   ) homothetic. But then, this uniform …nal consumption tax can be implemented by a uniform tax on both goods and payment services, independently of the weights     We can summarize as follows:
is uniform across goods, and this can be implemented by a common uniform tax across marketed goods and the payment service i.e.
So, we see that when there is no time input to household production, a uniform consumption tax on goods and …nancial services at the same rate may be an optimal tax structure (but not the only one). This directly generalizes the results of Auerbach and Gordon(2002) . Their model, is a …nite horizon version of the model of this section, where additionally, it is assumed that there is no time cost of purchasing any of the  goods. They show that in this environment, if there is a uniform tax already in place on the  marketed goods i.e.    =    then it is best to set    =   also 19 . We have extended this result by explicitly deriving the optimal tax structure and showing under what conditions a common uniform tax across marketed goods and the payment service is desirable. In particular, if there is no time cost of purchasing any of the  goods, a uniform tax on goods and the payment service is optimal under the standard conditions on preferences required for uniformity i.e. separability in goods and leisure and the goods sub-utility function homothetic. However, this result does not generally extend to the case where   i.e. time does substitute for payment services. For example, from Proposition 7, we see that with a Cobb-Douglas speci…cation and constant returns, for example, the optimal tax on payment services is zero. Thus, the Auerbach and Gordon(2002) result depends crucially on lack of substitutability between time costs and payment services 20 .
6. Extensions
Payment Services as Household Production
Our …ndings in Section 5 also relate to the small literature on optimal taxation with household production, in particular Kleven(2004) , who adopts Becker's(1965) household production framework 21 . First, note that in our framework, the link between the level of the good  actually consumed -  in Becker's notation -and the amount purchased in the market,    along with payment services   and time   can be written as follows, where we have dropped time subscripts for simplicity. First, the relationship (3.3),
 Then, the implicit Becker production function for our model can be written
In particular, they show that if there is initially a wage income tax at rate  which is replaced by a consumption tax at equivalent rate (1 ¡ ) then the real equilibrium is left unchanged if and only if transaction services are also taxed at this equivalent rate. 20 Proposition 8 below implies that uniform taxation of goods and the payment service is also an optimal tax structure where time is an input to transactions, but where time and payment services are not substitutable i.e. Leontief technology and the ratio of payment services to time required is uniform across goods. So, most generally, the Auerbach-Gordon result applies in an environment where time and payment services are used in …xed proportions, along with other conditions. 21 Other contributions include Sandmo(1990) , Anderberg and Balestrino(2000) , but these are less closely related.
That is, actual consumption is the minimum of the actual amount of market good  purchased,    and the amount of   that can be bought using payment services   and time    This implies that the consumer who wishes to consume at level   will buy   units of the market good and   =   (     ) units of payment services, along with time input    This compares to the version of Becker's production function studied by Kleven, where each …nal consumption good   is produced via a …xed coe¢cients production function, where household production of   requires a marketed good and time in …xed proportions:
and the household cares about …nal goods and leisure i.e.  = ( 1     ) Note the difference between our structure and Kleven's. In particular, his can formally be considered a special case of ours where the only other input to household production besides the marketed good is time    and the production function is linear 22 . However, in practice, the interpretations are slightly di¤erent. If good  is omelettes, then   would be number of eggs bought in both frameworks, but in Kleven's framework,   would be the time needed to cook an omelette, whereas in our framework,   would be the amount of time used to buy the eggs. Nevertheless, due to the formal similarity, it is helpful to compare our optimal tax rules to Kleven's. First, under some conditions on preferences, Kleven …nds a very simple optimal tax structure, where relative taxes across goods just depend on the household production technology. Speci…cally, given (6.2), the tax on good  is just inversely proportional to    the share of the marketed good in the total (tax-inclusive) cost of one unit   , where
where   is the producer price of   and   is the ad valorem tax on   (Kleven(2004) , Propositions 1-3). In fact, using our primal approach, it is possible to show that in his framework, the optimal tax is 23 where      have the standard de…nitions as in (4.14),(4.15). This in fact generalizes Proposition 3 of Kleven(2004) ; the latter is the special case of (6.3) where compensated cross-price e¤ects are zero. Then, if standard conditions for uniform taxes hold i.e.  = (( 1    ) ) where the sub-utility function is homothetic, it is well-known that
To make the link between our results and Kleven's, assume
in (6.1) i.e. payment services and time must be consumed in strict proportions. Then, our household production function (6.1) becomes
Now, consider the optimal tax problem, as de…ned in Section 5 above, with …xed coe¢-cients speci…cation (6.4) De…ne
   to be the share of the (tax-inclusive) cost of producing one unit of   that arises from the purchase of the marketed good and intermediation services. Then, it is straightforward to show: Proposition 8. In the case of a …xed coe¢cients production technology, the optimal overall tax rate on good    = (
where Comparing Proposition 8 to (6.3) , the formal similarity is clear. Note also that using Proposition 8, we can state two propositions that relate to Auerbach-Gordon(2002) . First, under the additional assumption that the payment services used in the purchase of di¤erent commodities can be taxed at di¤erent rates    , a possible optimal tax structure is to always tax good  and the payment services used to purchase good  at the same rate i.e.  So, most generally, the Auerbach-Gordon result applies in an environment where time and payment services are used in …xed proportions, and these proportions are the same across commodities.
Endogenizing Savings Intermediation Services
We have, so far, treated the service of savings intermediation by banks in rather "black box" fashion. In particular, we have treated    the amount of intermediation services per unit of capital supplied to …rm , as exogenous. However, it is clear that banks supply several di¤erent kinds of intermediation services, notably liquidity services (Diamond and Dybvig(1983) ), and monitoring services (Diamond (1991) , Besanko and Kanatas(1993) , Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) ). If these services provide externalities for the rest of the economy, then rather than In this version of the paper, we do not attempt provide a fully microfounded version of these kinds of intermediation services, for several reasons. First, it is technically di¢cult to embed some explicit models of intermediation services into the dynamic optimal tax framework. For example, "endogenize" intermediation by looking at the provision of liquidity services using Diamond-Dybvig model, which is undoubtedly the pre-eminent microeconomic model of banking. While this is a topic for future work, the problem is that the Diamond-Dybvig model has a three-period dynamic structure, which is very di¢cult to embed within the standard in…nite-horizon dynamic optimal tax model. Second, the payo¤ from doing so in terms of increased insights is not really proportionate to the increased complexity. In the end, bank intermediation activity, when explicitly modelled, may (or may not) have spillovers on the rest of the economy. If there are spillovers, then the optimal tax is a Piguovian one to internalise these spillovers. Ultimately, this is because the government can use the interest income tax to control the household's marginal rate of substitution between present and future consumption, and so any tax on intermediation services is a free instrument which can be used to internalize externalities arising from bank activity.
These general points are illustrated in a previous version of the paper, Lockwood(2010) , where   is interpreted as the level of bank monitoring, along the lines of Holmstrom and Tirole(1997) . In their framework, without monitoring, bank lending to …rms is impossible, because the informational rent they demand is so high that the residual return to the bank does not cover the cost of capital. So, as monitoring is costly, the socially e¢cient level of monitoring is that level which just induces to bank to lend. In the case where the bank is competitive, i.e. where …rm chooses the terms of the loan contract subject to a break-even constraint for the bank, an assumption commonly made in the …nance literature, this is also the equilibrium level of monitoring. In this case, savings intermediation should not be taxed, because doing to will violate production e¢ciency, as in the case with heterogenous …rms and a …xed amount of intermediation services per unit of savings. But, in the case where the bank is a monopolist i.e. it chooses the contract, it will generally choose a higher level of monitoring than this, in order to reduce the …rm's informational rent. So, in this case, the optimal tax is a positive Pigouvian tax, set to internalize this negative externality.
Conclusions
This paper has considered the optimal taxation of two types of …nancial intermediation services (savings intermediation, and payment services) in a dynamic economy, when the government can also use wage and capital income taxes. When payment services are used in strict proportion to …nal consumption, and the cost of intermediation services is the same across …rms, the optimal taxes on …nancial intermediation are generally indeterminate. But, when …rms di¤er in the cost of intermediation services, the tax on savings intermediation should be zero. Also, when household time and payment services are substitutes in household "production" of …nal consumption, the optimal tax rate on payment services is determinate, and is generally di¤erent to the optimal rate on consumption goods.
We then extended the analysis to many consumption goods in each period. We show that the presence of payment services generally makes it less likely that commodity taxation will be uniform within the period. Moreover, even if conditions hold for commodity taxation to be uniform, this does not imply that payment services need to be taxed at the same uniform rate as commodities. These results generalize, and demonstrate the limitations of, the Auerbach-Gordon(2002) result that if goods are subject to a uniform tax, payment services should be subject to the same tax.
There are two obvious limitations of the analysis. The …rst is that the government is assumed to be able to precommit to a tax policy at time zero. However, even in a simpler setting without a banking sector, the characterization of the optimal timeconsistent capital and labour taxes is a technically demanding exercise (see e.g. Phelan and Stacchetti (2001) ) and so such an extension is certainly beyond the scope of this paper.
The second is the restriction to linear income taxation. The classic result of Atkinson and Stiglitz tells us that with non-linear income taxation, commodity taxation is redundant, and more recently, Golosov et. al. (2003) has recently shown that this result generalizes to a dynamic economy. Their result would apply, for example, in a version of our model where households di¤er in skill levels, and without any …nancial intermediation. What would happen if we introduced …nancial intermediation in this environment? The results on taxation of payment services seem likely to be a¤ected, as the government has additional degrees of freedom with which to tax the notional "pro…t" from household production.
A. Appendix
A.1. Proofs of Propositions
Proof that ¸0 Suppose to the contrary that   0 at the optimum. Then, from the properties of ( )    0 from (4.14). So, from (4.14),       But from (4.8),(4.11), (4.13), (3.12):
So, combining the two, we see that
But, (A.1) says that utility could be increased if 1$ of spending on the public good were returned to the household as a lump-sum, contradicting the optimality of the policy. ¤ Proof of Proposition 2. From (4.7), (4.15), we get
 Next, from from (4.10),(4.12),
So, combining (A.2) and (A.3), we get
Next, using (3.8), (3.11),   = (1 ¡    )   and (3.15), we get:
where .5) , and eliminating
 we get that:
where is a solution in the steady state. ¤ Proof of Proposition 3. From (4.7), (4.8), (4.13),(4.14),(4.15),(3.12), we have
And, from (3.8),(3.9):
So, combining (A.7), (A.8) we get:
Also, from (4.8),(4.11),(4.13),(4.14),(3.12) we have:
Combining (A.9),(A.10) to eliminate  and rearranging, we get (4.18) as required. ¤ Proof of Proposition 4. From (3.10), we have
And from (4.9), (4.13), (3.12), we get:
But then, combining (A.11),(A.12) and using (4.11) and
as required. ¤ Proof of Proposition 5. Drop the "t" subscripts for convenience. As  is homogenous of degree 
Then, di¤erentiating, and cancelling terms,
So,
Substituting (A.13) into (4.19), we obtain (4.21), as required. Note that  0   00  0 implies
 so (4.20) then follows from (4.21)¤
A.2. The Many-Good Case
The household chooses
14) The FOC with respect to           +1 respectively are: .18) where   denotes the derivative of  with respect to    Combination of (A.15-A.18) with (A.14) gives the implementability constraint for government. This can be derived following the same steps as in the one-good case, by substituting (A.15-A.18 ) and .19) in (A.14) to give:
is the overhead cost of payment services, normalized by     0 and can thus be interpreted as the virtual pro…t of the household from transacting on the market. In the most plausible case where there is a …xed cost to payment services i.e.    0, virtual pro…t is negative.
So, the government chooses
!! subject to the resource constraints 
Averaging this across all goods, and using   = 0 from (A.28), we get (5.6) as required. Finally, in the case where The FOC with respect to           +1 respectively are:
Combination of (A.41-A.43) with (A.14) gives the implementability constraint for government. This can be derived similarly to the proof of Proposition 5 to give:
So, the government chooses f 1         +1    g 1 =0 to maximize
!! subject to the resource constraints
The FOC for this problem are : Then, using (A.10) to substitute for  in (A.51) which still applies in this case, we get
